Multi-Factor Biometric Access Control Eliminating Unauthorised Vault Entry at a Dhaka Commercial Bank
Zero unauthorised vault access incidents in 12 months post-deployment.
Client
Dhaka commercial bank
Location
Dhaka
Delivered
2026
Project Status
2026
Client Organization
Dhaka commercial bank
Deployment Location
Dhaka
Completion Year
2026
Brands & Systems
zkteco, bosch
Client Profile
A large private commercial bank with its three-floor headquarters building located in the Motijheel commercial district of Dhaka — Bangladesh's primary banking and financial hub. The bank operates over 60 branches nationally and manages a significant volume of cash, negotiable instruments, and sensitive financial records at its head office. The headquarters houses the bank's primary vault, two IT server rooms, the treasury department, and the executive management floor. Approximately 450 staff work across the three floors, with the vault and IT infrastructure areas accessed by a rotating pool of 35 authorized personnel.
The Challenge
The bank's vault security relied on a system that had changed little since the building's construction: a heavy steel door with a combination lock, supplemented by a shared four-digit PIN pad installed during a 2015 renovation. The combination was known to 8 people, and the PIN was functionally known to anyone who had ever watched a colleague enter it — a group that had expanded well beyond the authorized list through years of casual observation. There was no record of who entered the vault or when, beyond a paper logbook that required staff to manually sign in and out, a process routinely skipped during busy periods.
Tailgating was the most immediate security failure. The vault entry corridor led directly from the general operations floor, and during peak afternoon periods when the corridor was busy with staff movement, it was straightforward for an unauthorized person to follow an authorized colleague through the PIN-secured door without the authorized user challenging them. The bank's internal safety committee had flagged this in two consecutive annual reviews. Following a regional banking industry incident involving internal vault access fraud at a competing institution — widely discussed within Bangladesh's banking security community — the committee escalated their recommendation to an urgent board-level directive.
The IT server rooms presented a related but separate problem. One server room housed the bank's core banking system infrastructure; the other housed the WAN equipment and cybersecurity appliances. Both were secured only with standard key-and-lock arrangements. Keys were kept in the facilities office and signed out on a paper log. During a Bangladesh Bank IT security examination, the examiner noted the absence of electronic access logging for the server rooms and flagged it as a finding requiring remediation within 90 days.
Beyond the compliance finding, the bank's IT operations team had experienced a near-incident: a vendor technician working on HVAC equipment in the ceiling space above the core banking server room had briefly entered the server room itself without being challenged by any technical control. The incident was caught by a colleague's observation and reported, but it crystallized for the IT Director the risk of relying entirely on physical keys and procedural controls for rooms housing systems that processed millions of taka in transactions daily.
The bank's safety committee specifically required dual-person authentication for vault access — no single individual, regardless of seniority, should be able to access the vault alone. This requirement exceeded what a conventional single-factor access control system could enforce.
Why SSAL
The bank's Head of Facilities circulated a technical requirement document to five technology providers. SSAL distinguished itself during the technical evaluation by being the only vendor to propose a mantrap configuration for vault entry — a brief airlock-style enclosure between the corridor and vault door in which one person at a time is admitted and authenticated before the inner door can open. The other vendors proposed standard single-door access control, which would have improved audit logging but would not have solved the tailgating problem.
SSAL's team also had direct experience implementing OSDP v2 protocol integration — the open-supervised device protocol that enables encrypted, tamper-detected communication between card readers and access controllers. This technical capability was important to the bank's IT security team, who were concerned about Wiegand-protocol vulnerabilities after reading the Bangladesh Bank ICT Guideline v4.0 security advisory on access control card interception.
References from two other financial institutions where SSAL had completed access control installations — provided through the bank's informal industry network — confirmed SSAL's ability to deliver within a bank's operational constraints, including the requirement to maintain vault access continuity during installation.
The SSAL Solution
SSAL designed a layered access control architecture addressing the vault, IT server rooms, and executive floor, with integration across all controlled doors through a unified management platform.
Vault Mantrap — Dual-Factor Biometric Authentication: The vault entry corridor was converted into a two-stage mantrap by installing an outer security door approximately 1.8 metres before the existing vault door. The outer door is controlled by a ZKTeco SpeedFace V5L facial recognition terminal, which authenticates the first factor: the user's enrolled face. Once the outer door closes and the person is confirmed inside the mantrap vestibule, a secondary ZKTeco SF400 MIFARE card reader on the inner door prompts for their access card — the second factor. Dual-person authorization is enforced at the software level: the vault inner door will not open unless two separately authenticated individuals have presented credentials within a 90-second window. This enforces the safety committee's dual-person requirement without relying on procedural compliance.
The mantrap doors are controlled by mag-lock mechanisms with emergency break-glass release units on both sides, compliant with fire egress requirements. Door position sensors confirm that each door has fully closed before the next door can be released, preventing both tailgating and door-propping scenarios.
IT Server Room Access — Gallagher T20 Readers: Both IT server rooms received Gallagher T20 multi-technology card readers, supporting MIFARE DESFire EV2 encrypted cards. The Gallagher T20 readers communicate via OSDP v2 to the central access controller, providing encrypted reader-to-controller communication and tamper detection. Any attempt to physically interfere with the reader triggers an immediate alert to the security monitoring station. Server room access is configured as single-factor (card only) for efficiency during IT operations, but all access events are timestamped and logged with staff identity, time, door, and duration.
Central Access Controller — Hikvision DS-K2M060 Controller Network: An 8-door Hikvision DS-K2M060 access controller manages all controlled doors — the vault mantrap outer and inner doors, both server rooms, the treasury department entry, and the executive floor. The controller connects via the bank's dedicated security VLAN to the central Hikvision access management server, running iVMS-4200 Access Control. Real-time alerts are sent to the security manager's workstation and mobile phone for any access event at vault or server room doors, any failed authentication attempt, any door held open beyond 30 seconds, and any tamper event on readers or controllers.
Audit Logging and Reporting: All access events are retained in the system database for a rolling 24-month period, searchable by person, door, date range, or event type. A daily automated report is emailed to the bank's Compliance Officer showing all vault access events — entry time, exit time, both authenticated personnel, and any exceptions. This report format was specifically designed to satisfy the Bangladesh Bank examiner's finding regarding server room access logging, and was pre-reviewed by the bank's compliance team before the system went live.
Integration with CCTV: Hikvision cameras were added at the vault corridor entry and inside the mantrap vestibule, linked to the access control events. Any access control event at the vault automatically tags the corresponding video segment in the NVR, enabling investigators to instantly pull the footage associated with any specific vault entry event without manual time-searching.
Implementation
The installation was completed in 14 working days across three phases designed to maintain vault access continuity throughout. Phase 1 (Days 1-4) covered pre-installation work: cable runs through the vault corridor ceiling space, conduit installation for reader cabling, and controller rack installation in the IT room. No vault access was disrupted during this phase.
Phase 2 (Days 5-9) covered the server room reader installations and the Hikvision controller commissioning. Server room installations were performed during a planned weekend maintenance window, with IT staff present throughout to maintain oversight of the infrastructure.
Phase 3 (Days 10-14) was the vault mantrap installation — the most operationally sensitive phase. SSAL coordinated with the bank's facilities and vault management teams to schedule the outer door frame installation on a Friday afternoon after vault close. The outer mag-lock door was installed and tested over the weekend, with the full mantrap system operational by Monday morning opening. The bank's vault team ran parallel access for the first week — the old combination lock remained functional alongside the new biometric system — until 100% staff enrollment was confirmed and the legacy access method was disabled.
Staff enrollment covered all 35 authorized vault and server room users. SSAL's team conducted enrollment sessions over two half-days, capturing facial templates in the ZKTeco system and programming access permissions by individual and time schedule. A training session for security and IT operations staff covered the daily report review process, alert response procedure, and how to add or revoke access for personnel changes.
"The mantrap design was the piece we hadn't seen from any other vendor. We knew we needed biometrics, but SSAL showed us that biometrics at a single door still doesn't stop someone from walking in right behind an authorized person. The mantrap, combined with the dual-person software enforcement, gives us security that doesn't depend on our staff challenging each other — and in a banking environment, that kind of peer challenge is genuinely difficult. The Bangladesh Bank finding closure was the immediate win, but the real value is that we've closed a structural vulnerability that existed for years."
Results & Impact
Zero unauthorized vault access incidents have been recorded since system go-live. The dual-person authentication requirement — previously enforced only by procedural instruction — is now enforced mechanically: the vault door physically cannot open without two authenticated individuals, eliminating the risk of policy non-compliance under time pressure or seniority pressure.
The Bangladesh Bank examiner's finding on server room access logging was resolved at the 90-day follow-up examination. The bank's Compliance Officer presented the 90-day automated access log export, which the examiner accepted as satisfying the finding. The compliance finding was formally closed.
The audit trail has already demonstrated practical value: in one instance, a discrepancy between a staff member's claimed working hours and the payroll record was resolved within minutes by querying the access control log for that individual's entry and exit times from the server room. The case was handled internally without escalation.
Tailgating at the vault corridor has been structurally eliminated by the mantrap configuration. The safety committee's audit of the new system, conducted three months post-installation, rated the vault access control as fully satisfying their dual-person and anti-tailgate requirements — the first time in three consecutive annual reviews that vault security received a satisfactory rating.
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